Introduction
High technology markets are dynamic, fast-growing sectors characterized by a fast-paced innovation. Dominant positions in these markets may be challenged by innovators provided that entry barriers are not high In the first case the European Commission unconditionally cleared the proposed Microsoft acquisition of Skype in spite of the quasi-monopoly position the merged entity would have in the market for video communication services. The clearance decision was uphold by the General Court of the EU (GC) in the following appeal judgment Cisco Systems and Messagenet 4 . In the second case the Commission gave the go-ahead to the proposed acquisition of WhatsApp by Facebook, as the transaction would not threat the competition in the relevant markets for consumer communication, social networks and on-line advertising. The paper focuses, in particular, on the methodology followed by the Commission in these cases for the analysis of the combined market shares of the parties, network effects and degradation of interoperability. In conventional merger control all these are factors may come into relevance as economic evidence of the risk that a proposed transaction may restrain competition. The paper argues that, when reviewing mergers operations affecting high technology markets, due to the specific competition conditions prevailing in such markets, the Commission has assessed with care the parties' market shares, network effects and the interoperability between the products of the merged entity and those of competitors.
The structure of the article is as follows. Section two provides for a definition of high technology markets and outlines how the main characteristics of such markets may influence the competition review of merger operations. Section three examines the relevance of market shares of the merging parties. Section four looks at the role of network effects. Section five is about the approach of the Commission to the issue of interoperability. Section six draws a conclusion.
Definition of high technology markets
High technology markets are regarded as markets in which there is an intense degree and a fast pace of innovation; products in such markets have a short life cycle 5 , market shares are volatile and market power may be transient 6 . Incumbents in high technology markets are often giants with feet of clay 7 . Additional features of high technology markets that can play a role when appraising the effects on competition of mergers are network effects and interoperability 8 .
Network effects arise when a given product is more valuable to a user, the more users adopt the same product or compatible ones 9 . In high technology markets network effects may be physical, as the wide membership base of a social network, or virtual, as with complementary products such as between platforms and software. Markets where there are network effects tend to be quite highly concentrated. Network effects constitute a entry barrier and new operator have to make efforts to win away customers from incumbents 10 .
In high technology markets it is important that platform and software work together. Interoperability is recognized as a fundamental value in EU competition law 11 . It ensures that the new platform can compete with the incumbent platform, thereby enabling users that opt for the new technologies to communicate with users of existing technologies. In the context of merger control interoperability may come into relevance in two scenarios. First, the merging parties may degrade or even prevents interoperability between their products and those of competitors
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. Second, the Commission may rely on interoperability remedies to address the competition problems created by a proposed merger whose parties have the control of inputs essential for carrying out economic activities in downstream markets. To avoid the risk of foreclosing competitors, the Commission imposes on the merging parties the obligations to give competitors access to such key inputs 13 . . Moreover, the merging parties would face a fierce competition by numerous strong competitors.
Cisco and Messagenet, two competitors of the merging parties in the market for internet-based communication services challenged the Commission decision before the GC. They pleaded that the high shares of Microsoft and Skype in the market for video-calls made on Window-based PC had to be considered by the Commission as indicators of the market power of the merged entity.
The GC, however, rejected this pleading. It noted that the Commission distinguished the market for consumer communication from the market for business communication. Yet, the Commission left open the question as to further segment the wider market for consumer communication into narrower markets according the functionality, platform and operating systems of the communication services. Contrary to what the appellants argued, the Commission did not identify the relevant product market in the narrower market for consumer communication on Windows-based PC, where the merging parties would have a 80-90% combined share. Agreeing with the Commission, the GC held that even if the merging parties had very high market shares, such market shares were unstable and thus they would not be necessarily indicative of the market power of the merging parties. Crucially, the GC stressed that "the consumer communication sector is a recent and fast-growing sector which is characterised by short innovation cycles in which large market shares may turn out to be ephemeral".
In addition, the GC pointed to other relevant factors that contributed to the finding that the high market shares of the parties could not constitute a reliable proxy of market power. First, though PCs were still the most used platform, a growing demand for video communication services was generated from users of new platforms, such as smartphones and tablets. And the merging parties did not have a strong presence on this sector. Second, as the parties offered their services free of charge, had they attempted to charge a price for the services, customers would shift to other players that would not charge them.
b) The assessment of market shares under the previous decisional practice of the Commission
Under the decisional practice of the Commission the market shares of the merging parties are generally viewed a first-sight reliable indicator of the market power of the merged entity and, accordingly, of the possible competition problems of the under scrutiny merger. Nevertheless, in some cases the Commission has not considered market shares as a correct proxy for the market power of the merged entity, clearing the transaction in spite of the high market shares of the parties.
Apparently, in some merger cases the Commission did not attach importance to the market shares as there existed low entry barriers. In Alcatel/Telettra 16 the parties were found to have a 83% share and a 81% share in the markets for microwave equipment and for line transmission equipment, respectively. Notwithstanding that, the Commission approved the merger since customers could switch to alternative suppliers which could easily enter the market due to the low entry barriers. Alike, mitigating factors were also found by the Commission in Mercedes-Benz/Kässbohrer
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. The Commission ruled out that the merged entity had a dominant position in the German market for intercity buses, although it enjoyed a 74% share. In that regard, the Commission noted that both actual and potential competitors were capable to exert an effective competition pressure on the merged entity. The buying power of important customers of the parties was also considered a factor limiting the market power of the merged entity. Similarly, the Commission authorized the notified merger in Canon/Iris 18 , in spite of the very high market shares of the parties, which were close to the 90% threshold in some markets for the office automation equipment and capture software. Indeed, post-merger there were other strong operators capable to effectively compete with the merged entity.
On the contrary, the Commission's cautious approach in considering the relevance of market shares of the parties to mergers in high technology markets seems to be based on competition conditions the Commission found the parties to have relatively high shares of the relevant product market for the entry-level servers. However, the merger entity was found to be unlikely to enjoy a post-merger dominance. That was due to the dynamic and growing nature of the market with a rapidly evolving technology, combined with the volatility of market shares, absence of entry barriers and the presence of several strong competitors as well a series of fringe suppliers. The Commission followed a similar approach in Philips/Agilent 20 . When assessing the effects of the merger on competition on the cardiac ultrasound market, the Commission noted that this was a dynamic, innovation-driven market. Manufacturers' market positions repeatedly changed due to new product developments. And since ongoing technological innovation, particularly new dynamic imaging techniques in the cardiac segment, were expected to continue, no single company would dominate the market.
c) The relevance of the judgment of the General Court and the Commission's decision in Facebook/WhatsApp
The CG judgment in Cisco Systems and Messagenet should be taken in great consideration as for the first time a EU court sanctioned the cautious approach of the Commission towards the relevance of market shares in dynamic high technology markets. This appears to be a welcome development for firms having large market shares in such sectors and planning to grow externally through acquisitions of competitors. It can be easily predicted that the precedent in Cisco Systems and Messagenet will be cited by the parties to mergers in high technology markets to assuage the Commission's concerns about the economic effects of the proposed transactions.
It is worth noting that such cautious approach was then followed by the Commission in Facebook/WhatsApp, when looking at the competition impact of the merger in the market of consumer communication services based on smartphone platforms. On considering whether the methodology proposed by the parties to calculate their market shares was correct or not, the Commission pointed out that 'the consumer communication sector is a recent and fast-growing sector which is characterised by frequent market entry and short innovation cycle in which large market shares may turn out to be ephemeral. In such a dynamic context, the Commission takes the view that in this market high market shares are not necessarily indicative of market power and, therefore, of lasting damage to competition'
The Commission used a language similar to that of the GC in Cisco Systems and Messagenet. Eventually, the Commission reached the conclusion that the proposed Facebook acquisition of WhatsApp was unlikely to have a negative impact on competition in the market of consumer communication services based on smartphone platforms. It must be noted, however, that the collective market shares of the parties in Facebook/WhatsApp were estimated in the region of 30-40% and were much lower than those of Microsoft and Skype. 
The assessment of network effects
a) The assessment of network effects in Microsoft/Skype and Facebook/Whatsapp Though in the Microsoft/Skype decision the Commission acknowledged the existence of network effects, it then found that the relevance of such effects were mitigated by the fact that consumers mostly used communication services to call a small number of family and friends. It is not difficult for those belonging to such "inner circle" to switch to different providers of communication services. Moreover, consumers tend to use different communication services, thereby opting for multi-homing. As a result, there were low entry barriers as reflected by the fact that new entrants succeeded in rapidly expanding their basis of users 22 . . Like the Commission did, also the GC seemed to attach much importance to the phenomenon of multi-homing. It noted that, relying on multi-homing, it was relatively easy for consumers to switch to other communication services by small group and continue using several communication services at the same time. According to the theory of network effects, the more a communication software enables consumers to contact users of other programmes, the more attractive the software is. Yet, considering the weak presence of the Windows communication software, WLM, in the faster growing platforms other than Windowsbased PCs, the GC took the view that the merger was unlikely to modify the competition structure of markets.
Similarly, in Facebook/WhatsApp the Commission took the view that the existing network effects in the market for consumer communication services could not be taken as evidence that the proposed merger would restrain competition by foreclosing competitors of the merged entity. Indeed, a number of factors mitigated the role of network effects as possible entry barriers. First, regardless of the size of the network effects, consumer communication apps were a fast-moving sector with low switching costs for consumers and low barriers to entry and expansion as reflected by the long track record of successful new entries 25 . Second, multi-homing enabled consumers to use different competing consumer communication apps. Importantly, as the Commission noted, 'multi-homing is Departing from neoclassical economics, which rests around the fundamental assumption that market subjects rationally act to maximize profit, behavioural economics teaches that in some circumstances market subjects may make irrational decisions. A number of academics and competition enforces have put forward the idea to apply the principles of behavioral economics to competition law enforcement, which is traditionally based on neoclassical economics. In their view, the so-called behavioural antitrust provides for a more accurate understanding of the conducts of economic operators, be they consumers or firms . Microsoft marketed its Windows OS with Windows Media Player (WMP) and the browser Internet Explorer already installed. Consumers could not buy Windows OS without also buying Windows Media Player (Microsoft I) and Internet Explorer (Microsoft (Tying)) and were then coerced into buying the tying product along with the tied product. The Commission pointed out that users did not switch to other software products, though they are easily and freely downloadable because of they are biased by the so-called 'end-users inertia'. Consumers were then unable to make optimal choices due to such biases and their inability was exploited by . Finally, using a language similar to that of the GC, as said above, the Commission pointed out that the software was free, easy to download and took up little space on the user's smartphones, thereby favouring multi-homing
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In sum, Microsoft I and Microsoft (Tying), on one hand, and Cisco Systems and Messagenet and Facebook/WhatsApp, on the other hand, seems to rest on a conflicting perception of users of apps. The former, relying on the teaching of behavioural economics, perceive users as being prone to be caught by consumers' biases. Users are then unable to actively download software programmes other than those pre-installed on platforms. The latter, on the contrary, view users as ready to download programmes they like. It should be borne in mind that the facts in Microsoft I and Microsoft (Tying) differed from those in Cisco Systems and Messagenet and Facebook/WhatsApp in some relevant aspects. Indeed, in the former the tied software came already pre-installed in the platforms, whereas they were not so in the latter. It is, however, uncertain whether such difference suffice to explain the less strict position of the GC in Cisco Systems and Messagenet and of the Commission in Facebook/WhatsApp. It is also unclear whether in Cisco Systems and Messagenet and Facebook/WhatsApp the GC and the Commission reconsidered the relevance of behavioural 32 Petit and Rato, above note n. 5. antitrust theories, which the Commission seemed ready to accept in Microsoft I and Microsoft (Tying).
The issue of interoperability between the products of the merged entity and those of competitors
a) The analysis of the interoperability in the Commission's decision in Microsoft/Skype
In Microsoft/Skype the issue of interoperability arose when assessing the possible conglomerate effects of the merger on the market for enterprise communication services. It was feared that the merger might create a preferential link between Microsoft programme for enterprise communication system, Lync, and Skype's user base by degrading the interoperability between Skype and rival OSs of Microsoft Windows or by degrading the interoperability of Windows with competing communication services. It also feared that the merged entity would integrate Skype and Microsoft products 37 . In these ways the merger would give the products of the merged entity a competitive advantage especially with respect to firms using call centers.
The Commission dismissed all the above competition concerns. It ruled out that the merged entity would have the ability to degrade the interoperability of Skype with competing operators, because the Skype services were not suitable for firms using call centres. Nor the merged entity would have the incentive to prevent firms using competing communication services from contacting users of Skype. Indeed, such business users would be able to freely download Skype applications. Moreover, Skype was not a "must have" product for firms using call centres as there existed several alternative communication services.
b) The interoperability issue in the Cisco Systems and Messagenet judgment.
The analysis of the Commission was contested by the appellants in Cisco Systems and Messagenet. They argued that the Commission understimated the risk that the merger would have foreclosing effects through creating a preferential interoperability between the services of the merging parties, with the ensuing degradation of the interoperability between Skype and the other suppliers of enterprise communication services.
To start with, the GC referred to the EU case law on conglomerate mergers, which, as is known, normally do not give rise to competition concerns 38 . The EU courts set quite a high evidentiary standard to which, under the EUMR, the Commission has to prove that a given conglomerate merger may significantly impede competition. The GC pointed out that the appraisal of a conglomerate merger implies a prospective future-looking analysis, under which the causality links between the merger and the feared anti-competitive effects are dimly discernible and difficult to establish. Then the GC proceeded with establishing whether the anti-competitive effects expected 38 Commission Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers, Official Journal C 265 of 18.20.2008. from the integration strategy of the merging parties could be assessed within the framework of conglomerate merger analysis. In that regard, the GC stated that in order for the alleged negative effects on competition to be relevant under the EUMR, they have to materialize in sufficiently near future.
In this case, however, the Commission estimated that at least three year would be necessary to complete the integration of the Lync and Skype services due to the technical and commercial problems that had to be resolved before launching the integrated product. Crucially, the GC found that this period of time was too long, taking into account that the relevant product market "is a new technology sector which is characterised by relatively short innovation cycles". Moreover, the likelihood that the strategy integration would lead to foreclosure effects depended on many future factors, the occurrence of which was uncertain. Furthermore, the possibility that competitors might counteract the merging parties's foreclosure strategy by adjusting their policies should be considered as a factor decreasing the likelihood of the occurrence of such anti-competitive effects. In other words, foreclosure of competitors might take place at the end of a period of time too long to be considered as a direct consequence of the merger.
In addition, the appellants failed to indicate which commercial advantages the integration strategy would give to the merged entity. It remains unclear why businesses should opt for the integrated products and might wish to communicate with their clients through Skype. As said above, postmerger the Skype application would be still downloadable for free. Thus, it would be possible for firms to keep communicating with their customers via Skype and no need to use the new product integrating Lync and Skype would be necessary.
All in all, Cisco Systems and Messagenet is an important judgment since the GC made it clear that in order to block a conglomerate merger in the high technology market, the Commission have to establish that the merger will have a negative impact on competition by a period of time not longer than three years. It can be argued that in future the judgment may make more difficult for the Commission to block this type of merger operations, due to the difficulties to prove that the feared competition harms have to occur within such a period of time TIP protocol for communication between its screens and those of competitors. To give the go-ahead to the merger, the Commission required Cisco to give a set of behavioural remedies, which included the divestment of its intellectual property rights on the TIP protocol in favour of an independent third party.
In Intel/McAfee the merging parties intended to integrate the security products of McAfee into the CPUs manufactured by Intel. This strategy integration would degrade the vertical interoperability between the Intel CPUs and security products of competitors of McAfee as well as the interoperability between the CPUs of competitors of Intel and the security products of McAfee
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. To put it in other words, the merger would favour a combination between complementary products, such as Intel CPUs and McAfee security products, foreclosing competing producers of CPUs and security products 43 . To address such competition concerns, the Commission authorized the transaction upon the condition of the parties complying with a of set of access remedies. More specifically, Intel entered into the obligation to provide competitors with interoperability information for its current and future products on royalty-free basis.
On the contrary, the integration strategies pursued by the parties in Microsoft/Skype may threaten the interoperability between the products of Skype and those of rival operators, leading to risks of anti-conglomerate effects foreclosing competitors similar to those considered by the Commission in Intel/McAfee. Notwithstanding that, the Commission took the view, upheld by the GC on appeal in Cisco Systems and Messagenet, that the integration strategies in Microsoft/Skype would not give rise to relevant competition concerns. It is not easy to reconcile Microsoft/Skype and Cisco Systems and Messagenet with Intel/McAfee. It can be argued that the Commission and GC considered the integration strategies pursued by Microsoft with the purchase of Skype unlikely to negatively affect the competition, since the tied product would be available for free download after the implementation of the merger. However, it must be said that offering products for free is a commercial policy quite common in the Internet economy. And in the longer period this policy may have economic effects detrimental to competition 44 .
Conclusion
This paper has shown that in some respects the Commission takes a more cautious approach when appraising the competition impact of mergers in high technology markets. As for horizontal mergers, the Commission ruled that the high market shares collectively held by the parties cannot be relied on as indicator of the market power of the parties due to the changeability of markets. Also the relevance of network effects as possible barriers to entry may be mitigated by the possibility of 41 Petit and Rato, above note n. 5. multi-homing and the availability for free of alternative programmes. Arguably, free downloadability of alternative apps can also assuage the risk of foreclosure due to degradation of interoperability.
Finally, in order to find a conglomerate mergers to significantly impede competition, the causality link between that merger and the restriction of competition must take place within a reasonable period of time. In Cisco Systems and Messagenet the GC made it clear that in order for such anticompetitive effects to be relevant under the EUMR, they should occur before three years since the consummation of the merger.
